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Abstract— Wireless sensor networks have been analyzed for 
more than a decade from operational and security points of view. 
Several key predistribution schemes have been proposed in the 
literature. Although valuable and state-of-the-art proposals have 
been made, their corresponding security analyses have not been 
performed by considering the dynamic nature of networking 
behavior and the time dimension. The sole metric used for 
resiliency analysis of key predistribution schemes is "fraction of 
links compromised" which is roughly defined as the ratio of 
secure communication links that the adversary can compromise 
over all secure links. However, this metric does not consider the 
dynamic nature of the network; it just analyzes a snapshot of the 
network without considering the time dimension. For example, 
possible dead nodes may cause change of routes and some 
captured links become useless for the attacker as time goes by. 
Moreover, an attacker cannot perform sensor node capturing at 
once, but performs over time. That is why a methodology for 
dynamic security analysis is needed in order to analyze the 
change of resiliency in time a more realistic way. In this paper, 
we propose such a dynamic approach to measure the resiliency of 
key predistribution schemes in sensor networks. We take the time 
dimension into account with a new performance metric, 
"captured message fraction". This metric is defined as the 
percentage of the messages generated within the network to be 
forwarded to the base station (sink) that are captured and read 
by the attacker.  Our results show that for the cases where the 
static fraction of links compromised metric indicates 
approximately 40% of the links are compromised, our proposed 
captured message fraction metric shows 80% of the messages are 
captured by the attacker. This clearly proves the limitations of 
the static resiliency analysis in the literature. 
Keywords: message capture; node capture; resiliency analysis; 
sensor networks; minimum cost routing; key predistribution 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) consist of large number of 
small devices, called sensor nodes, which sense and process 
information related to a particular application [4]. Sensor 
nodes are battery powered devices with limited computation 
and short range communication capabilities. The ultimate aim 
in a sensor network is to transfer the sensed information to a 
base station (sink) via multi-hop network. In-network data 
processing, e.g.. data aggregation, is also a common practice.  
Depending on the application, confidentiality and/or 
authenticity of the data may be an important design criteria. 
In-network data processing requirements cause link-by-link 
data processing and consequently setting up pairwise 
cryptographic keys among the neighboring sensor nodes. In 
the literature, there are several key distribution schemes 
proposed for sensor networks [1, 8, 9, 10, 11] as will be 
described in Section II. The resiliency of these schemes is 
analyzed by the amount of secure links compromised as the 
attacker capture nodes in the network. An implicit assumption 
in this type of resiliency analysis is that the resiliency effect of 
each link is the same. However, this is not correct. Some links 
may not be used at all due the underlying routing mechanism; 
some links, especially the ones close to the sink, are more 
critical than the others since more messages pass through 
those links. Moreover, sensor networks are dynamic ones such 
that some nodes malfunction or deplete their batteries or some 
links may be dropped due to hidden node problem. In such 
cases, new routes are established. That means, the links which 
carry data my change during the lifetime of the network.   
In this paper, we envision that the existing resiliency 
analyses of the key distribution schemes in the literature are 
quite limited. They do not reflect the actual damage of node 
capture since the network analysis is done in a static way 
without considering the effects of the real networking 
behaviors. Dead nodes and route changes should also be 
considered in a dynamic way in the time dimension. 
Moreover, the existing analyses assume that the attacker 
captures all nodes at the same time, which is totally 
unrealistic. In point of fact, node capture is performed over the 
time. Last, but not the least, the real damage of node capture 
must be measured as a function of messages captured by the 
attacker, not as the links compromised. In this paper, we 
address the abovementioned dynamicity problems of 
resiliency analysis of key predistribution schemes in WSNs. 
We consider the dynamic networking behavior in simulations 
and propose a novel metric, captured message fraction, as a 
realistic measure of attacker's harm on the network. In that 
respect, we measure the fraction of messages captured by the 
attacker. We compare the results of our dynamic analysis with 
classical static one. Our results show tremendous deficiency of 
static analyses in perception of the harm caused by attackers.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
gives background information and sketch of our contribution. 
Section III explains the details of our dynamic simulation 
model. In Section IV, the performance evaluation is given. 
Section V summarizes the conclusions reached by this work. This work is supported by Scientific and Technological Research Council 
of Turkey (TUBİTAK) under grant 104E071 
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II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND SKETCH OF 
CONTRIBUTION 
A. Key Distribution in WSNs 
In order to fulfill the confidentiality and authentication 
requirements of the data transferred in a sensor network, 
pairwise keys must be established. The deployment of sensor 
nodes over the field is considered as random, which makes it 
impossible to know which nodes will be neighbors of each 
other prior to the deployment. Thus, equipping the large 
amount of sensor nodes with all possible pairwise keys 
requires a huge amount of key memory. This is not a feasible 
approach. Using public key cryptosystems [5, 6] for key 
establishment is costly for computationally limited sensor 
nodes. In the WSN literature, the common approach for key 
distribution is the random key predistribution schemes in 
which reasonable amount of keys or keying materials are 
distributed to each sensor node prior to the deployment. This 
idea is first proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor [1]. There are 
three phases in Eschenauer and Gligor (EG) random key 
predistribution scheme. In key pre-distribution phase, each 
sensor node is given a set of keys from a large pool of keys 
randomly. In shared key discovery phase, each neighboring 
sensor node pair try to find a common key between their sets 
of keys. If one is found, then it is used as their link key. If not, 
this node pair executes the path key establishment phase in 
which the pairwise key is established with the help of other 
secure neighbors over a few hops at the cost of more 
communications. In the literature After EG scheme, some 
other key distribution schemes and improvements are 
proposed in the literature. A scheme taking deployment 
knowledge into account is proposed by Du et al. [8]. 
Improvements over [1] are proposed by Chan et al. [9]. Du et 
al. [10] and Liu and Ning [11] proposed other random key 
predistribution schemes. 
B. Routing in WSNs 
In the literature, there are several well-known routing 
protocols which try to reduce the energy consumption due to 
message flow from individual sensor node to the sink. They 
are classified into four basic categories as discussed in [3]: 
Data centric protocols such as Flooding and Gossiping [12], 
Directed diffusion [13]; Hierarchical protocols such as 
LEACH [14]; Location based protocols such as GAF [15], 
GEAR [16]; and Network Flow and QoS aware protocols such 
as Minimum Cost Forwarding [2]. 
In those protocols, security is not considered by design. On 
the other hand, secure routing [17] protocols are proposed 
which consider security at the design level. These include 
SecLEACH [18] and TTSR [19].  
C. Limitations of Resiliency Analysis in the Literature 
Sensor nodes are susceptible to certain types of attacks, 
such as impersonation, message interception, and fabrication, 
when they are deployed into hostile areas of operation. The 
nodes may be captured by an attacker whose aim differs 
according to the attacker scenario. Attacker obtains the keys 
that are stored in the captured node’s key ring and use them in 
order to eavesdrop on messages as well as transmitting false 
information to other nodes. This, of course, is possible if the 
captured sensor node does not have tamper proof hardware. In 
fact, in most sensor networks, simple nodes are used and 
expensive tamper resistance hardware solutions are not 
implemented. 
Resiliency analysis of both key distribution and routing 
schemes has been centered around the survivability of the 
network in presence of adversary capturing nodes. In those 
analyses, fraction of links compromised has been used as the 
main metric for key predistribution schemes. In the literature, 
this metric is defined as the fraction of additional secure 
communication links among uncaptured nodes that an 
adversary can compromise based on the information retrieved 
from previously captured nodes [8]. In other words, this metric 
considers the links among the uncaptured nodes. Since the 
same keys may be reused in different areas of the network, 
capturing of a node and its keys cause some other links in 
different parts of the network to be compromised as well.   
The resiliency analysis of the key predistribution schemes 
proposed in the literature using this fraction of links 
compromised metric is actually a static one such that it does 
not consider the dynamic nature and operational 
characteristics of WSNs as detailed below: 
− The classical fraction of links compromised metric 
implicitly, and wrongfully, assumes that all secure links are 
of the same importance level. Therefore, the amount of harm 
caused by the compromised links cannot be measured 
precisely. Due to the operational characteristics of the 
network and the routing schemes employed, there might be 
cases where some links are not used and some links are used 
extensively since they are close to the sink.  
− The sensor nodes may deplete their energies as they transmit 
and receive data packets. In such cases, the routing changes 
dynamically over the time. In the classical resiliency 
analysis of proposed key distribution schemes, this fact is 
not taken into account since the sensor network is not 
simulated over time considering such operational 
characteristics.  
− Energy depletion also affects the eavesdropping on the 
transmissions. This is due to the fact that a node, of which 
encryption keys are at the hand of the adversary, may die 
and further transmission would be carried over other nodes.  
D. Our Contribution and Assumptions 
As detailed in the previous subsection, fraction of links 
compromised is not a suitable security metric for resiliency 
analysis due to the dynamic nature of WSNs. In order to 
measure the real harm of node captures, one needs to perform 
network simulations by considering the operational 
characteristics of the network and dynamic changes in routing 
over time. In other words, the time dimension should also be 
incorporated in the analyses which is lacking in classical 
analyses in the literature. In this paper, we address these 
abovementioned issues via network simulations. We define the 
dynamic equivalent of the fraction of links compromised 
metric. We also propose and analyze a novel and more 
realistic metric which takes dynamic nature of the network 
This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE ICC 2009 proceedings
Authorized licensed use limited to: ULAKBIM UASL - SABANCI UNIVERSITY. Downloaded on November 25, 2009 at 04:19 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
structure as well as the key management into consideration. 
This metric, called captured message fraction, is basically 
defined as the fraction of messages obtained by the attacker 
over all messages transferred in the network. We analyze the 
changes of these metrics with respect to time for different key 
ring sizes, message generation and node capture rates. Our 
simulation results show that there is an important gap between 
the classical metric and the proposed captured message 
fraction metric.  
We consider the EG scheme [1] as the underlying sample 
random key predistribution model in our analysis. We do not 
propose an improvement of EG scheme, since our aim in this 
paper is to show the limitation of classical resiliency analyses 
rather than improving the key predistribution schemes.  
In our simulation model, security threat comes from the fact 
that a node can be physically captured by the attacker. 
Moreover, we do not assume tamper-proof hardware to protect 
the private information in a tiny and simple sensor node since 
this would be an expensive security measure. Therefore, the 
keys of a captured node are assumed to be compromised by 
the attacker. On the other hand, the sink is assumed to be in a 
safe place and cannot be captured.  
III.  SIMULATION MODEL 
In this section, we describe our simulation model including 
the key distribution, routing and other network operations. 
A. Random Key Predistribution and Key Establishment 
We use Eschenauer and Gligor’s [1] EG random key 
predistribution scheme in our simulations. This scheme 
consists of three phases: (i) key pre-distribution, (ii) shared 
key discovery and (iii) path key establishment. Path key 
establishment phase is not put into operation in our simulation 
model since the resiliency analysis considers only the direct 
keys established in the second phase.  
Key predistribution phase: An offline key distribution 
center randomly picks k keys for each node out of a large key 
pool that consists of P distinct keys. Each key has an 
identifier. Selected keys along with their key identifiers are 
loaded into the memory of the sensor node before the 
deployment. These stored keys constitute the node's key ring.  
 Shared-key discovery phase: After the nodes are deployed 
onto the sensor network area, each node discovers its 
neighbors, which are the nodes within the communication 
range. Then, each sensor node broadcasts the list of its key 
identifiers (not the keys themselves) of its key ring in 
cleartext. After that, each neighboring node pair finds out 
whether they share a common key in their key rings by 
comparing local key identifiers and the ones received from its 
neighbor. If one such key is found, then it is used as the link 
key between these two neighboring nodes. Attacker cannot 
mount an attack in this phase, since it does not know the 
values of the actual keys corresponding to the key identifiers. 
The parameters of key pool size, P, and key ring size, k, are 
important since it determines the probability of two 
neighboring nodes sharing a key. In [1], this probability is 
called as local connectivity. It is desirable to have high local 
connectivity with increased k/P ratio, but increased local 
connectivity makes the system less resilient since more keys 
are reused in different parts of the network. Thus, there is a 
tradeoff here. Moreover, having a large k value may not be 
feasible due to the memory limitations of sensor nodes.  
In our simulations we consider different k/P values in order 
to obtain the desired local connectivity for which resiliency 
and message capture is to be explored.  
B. Routing 
In our sensor network model, minimum cost forwarding 
protocol [2] is selected as the routing protocol to be 
implemented. In this protocol, the cost criteria can be taken as 
hop count, energy consumption, and/or delay, etc. Minimum 
cost forwarding is based on the cost field phenomenon. Cost 
field of a node is defined as the minimum cost from that node 
to the sink on the optimal path. 
In route establishment phase, similar to minimum cost 
forwarding protocol explained in [2], our network nodes 
construct minimum cost field based on their distance to the 
base station node. In our model, it is assumed that all nodes 
know their relative positions to their neighbors. In addition, at 
the center of the sensor network area, there is a sink node 
which is more powerful than other sensor nodes, may be a 
laptop-class sensor node. This sink plays the role of a base 
station to where all of the packets generated within the 
network are to be forwarded.  
In order to establish routing, firstly, all nodes that are 
within the transmission range of the sink set their parent node 
as the sink node and send their messages directly to it. Then, 
those nodes that have sink node as their parents broadcast this 
information to their neighboring nodes. Afterwards, each one 
of the remaining nodes sequentially finds a parent by 
considering the distances of the neighboring nodes that are 
within the transmission range. Recursively, minimum cost 
field is constructed for each node. 
C. Sensor Network Operations 
1) Re-routing to circumwent dead nodes: During the 
operation of the network, some nodes deplete their energy and 
die. In such a case, all predecessors of the dead node try to 
find a new parents in order to forward their outgoing 
messages. To do so, a child node checks its neighboring nodes 
of which it shares at least one key. If there are one or more 
such nodes, it chooses one with the least routing cost by 
applying the same logic as the one used in the initial routing 
protocol. If there is no such a node, the child node is marked 
as disconnected and its children try to find a new path. This 
logic continues recursively until all the child nodes find their 
corresponding parents. If no parent could be found by a child 
node, then this node becomes disconnected from the network 
and does not generate and/or forward messages any more.   
2) Message Generation and Forwarding: In our simulation 
model, message forwarding is performed over the routes 
established previously. Moreover in our simulation model, the 
time dimension is divided into epochs of 100 milliseconds. In 
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each time epoch, each sensor node first determines whether or 
not to generate a new message to be sent to the base station. If 
generated, this new message is put into the node's outgoing 
buffer along with the messages received from the children 
nodes. Finally all the messages in the outgoing buffers are 
forwarded towards the next hop.   
In our simulation model, sensor nodes decide whether or not 
to generate a new message probabilistically. This probability 
is determined using the system parameter message generation 
rate, Rg, which is defined as the average number of messages 
generated in a time unit. We use messages/minute as the unit 
of Rg. Given that one time epoch is 0.1 seconds, the 
probability of a node to generate a new message during an 
epoch is calculated as Rg /600 in our simulations.  
Message forwarding is performed irrespective of capture 
status of the next node (whether it is captured or not). Thus, if 
the next node is a captured one, then all the outgoing messages 
are captured and read by the attacker. 
3) Node and Message Capture: In our attack model, there is 
an active attacker that captures nodes and illegally decrypts  
messages that were encrypted with the compromised keys 
obtained from the captured nodes. We employ a random 
capture model in which the attacker picks the nodes to be 
captured at random locations without any bias. Moreover, we 
assume that the attacker or its agent is capable of listening to 
the entire network and in order to obtain the messages that are 
sent and received by uncaptured nodes. 
The attacker in this model captures a node in each time 
epoch probabilistically. This probability is derived from 
another system parameter called the node capture rate, Rc. 
This parameter is defined as the average number of nodes 
captured by the attacker per hour. Given that one time epoch is 
0.1 seconds, the probability of the attacker to capture a node in 
an epoch is calculated as Rc /36000 in our simulations. 
It is assumed that base station would never be captured by 
the attacker which would result in total network collapse.  
Whenever attacker captures a sensor node in a time epoch, it 
learns and saves the keys in captured node’s key ring. In 
addition, attacker starts capturing and reading encrypted 
messages that pass through this currently captured sensor 
node. Moreover, if the keys learned in this way are used to 
secure other links between uncaptured nodes in the other parts 
of the network, the encrypted messages sent over these links 
are also compromised by the attacker.  
In our network model, the attacker may capture the same 
message more than once if more than one links are 
compromised en route. Duplicate message capture can occur 
since in our model there is no real-time attack detection and 
prevention logic. It is assumed that the attacker modifies none 
of the captured nodes and messages; thus, network operates as 
if there is no attack. However in our model, the attacker, in 
cooperation with all captured nodes, records message ids of 
captured messages in order not to unnecessarily decrypt and 
store it again and again. In this way, we avoid double counting 
of the captured messages and accurately generate our results 
on message capture statistics. 
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
We perform several network simulations in order to 
understand the resiliency behavior of WSNs against node 
captures while the network is dynamically operating over 
time. We consider three important parameters in our 
simulations:  node capture rate, message generation rate, and 
key ring size. All simulations are reported with respect to time 
(i.e. the x axis is the simulation time).   
In all simulations, the sensor field is taken as 1000m × 
1000m area. The number of nodes deployed over this area is 
10,000. Communication range of a node is taken as 40m. The 
keys are drawn from a key pool in which there are 100,000 
distinct keys. Energy capacity of the nodes is determined such 
that each sensor node is able to forward a total of 250,000 
messages. One simulation time unit (epoch) is taken as 100 
milliseconds. Simulation code is developed in C++ using MS 
Visual Studio 2005 on Windows XP running on an Intel 
Celeron 1.7 GHz M processor. 
A. Performance Metrics for Resiliency  
We explore the effects of different values the 
abovementioned three parameters on fraction of links 
compromised and captured message fraction metrics.  
The metric of fraction of links compromised was defined in 
Section II.C by referring its classical definition in the 
literature. We use this classical definition in our simulation 
model, but as a different feature, instead of the number of 
nodes captured, we show its change over time dynamically.   
The metric of captured message fraction is the unique 
feature of our model. It is defined as the number of encrypted 
messages read by the attacker as a result of node and 
consequently link key captures over all encrypted messages 
sent over the network. This metric gives a better 
understanding of the harm caused by the attacker since the 
ultimate aim of link captures is nothing but reading the 
encrypted messages. As mentioned in Section III.C.3, each 
message generated in the network is counted only once. In this 
way, the results obtained become more realistic. 
B. Effect of Key Ring Size 
We perform simulations for key ring size values of 300, 
400, and 500 keys that correspond to 0.60, 0.80 and 0.92 local 
connectivity, respectively. In these simulations, message 
generation rate and node capture rate are fixed to 1.5 messages 
per minute and 8 nodes per hour, respectively. The results of 
both metrics (message capture fraction and fractions of links 
compromised) are depicted in Figure 1. As can be seen from 
this figure, in both metrics, capture fractions increase with the 
increasing values of key ring size (and consequently local 
connectivity).   
Besides, it is also deduced from Figure 1 that for each key 
ring size, fraction of links compromised metric increases 
linearly with respect to simulation time. However, percentage 
of captured messages metric shows logarithmic increase (i.e. 
rate of increase reduces). Moreover, it is also observed that 
there is significant gap between the captured message fraction 
and fraction of links compromised for each key ring size. The 
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implications of these last two observations will be discussed in 
more detail in the next subsection. 
 
Figure 1.  Resiliency metrics w.r.t. Simulation time for different key ring size 
values 
C. Effects of Message Generation and Node Capture Rates 
We also analyzed the effects of message generation rate and 
node capture rate on the resiliency metrics. In those analyses, 
the key ring size is fixed to 300.  
Figure 2 shows the change of the fraction of links 
compromised with respect to simulation time for three 
different node capture rates: 8, 12 and 24 nodes per hour.  In 
those simulations message generation rate is taken as 1.5 
messages per minute for each node within the network. As can 
be seen in Figure 2, the linear increase behavior of fraction of 
link compromised with respect to time does not change as the 
node capture rate changes. When node capture rate is 
increased, it leads to an increase in fraction of links 
compromised as expected. Moreover, an increase in node 
capture rate results in nearly equal rate of increase in the 
fraction of links compromised (e.g. doubling node capture rate 
leads to an approximately 100% increase in the fraction).  
 
Figure 2.  Fraction of links compromised wrt. simulation time for different 
node capture rates 
Figure 3 shows the change in the fraction of captured 
messages with respect to simulation time for different node 
capture rates. The same parameters as Figure 2 are used here 
as well. Different than the other metric, fraction of captured 
messages metric exhibits a logarithmic increase behavior 
especially for high node capture rates. For low capture rates, 
the increase is still logarithmic, but the rate of increase does 
not change so rapidly. This logarithmic increase behavior 
indicates that the effect of node captures and consequently link 
compromises is more severe at the beginning of the attack. As 
the attacker continues to capture more nodes, his/her marginal 
gain reduces. This result is one of the important conclusions of 
our proposed analysis model since it cannot be seen by 
analyzing the fraction of links compromised metric only.  
 
 
Figure 3.  Fraction of captured  messages w.r.t. simulation time for different 
node capture rates 
We also examine the effect of message generation rate on 
both metrics.  In these simulations,  node capture rate has been 
fixed to 12 nodes per hour. Simulations are performed for four 
different message generation rates ranging from 0.75 to 6 
messages per minute. Corresponding results are given in 
Figure 4.  As it is seen from this figure, message generation 
rate does not have significant effect both on the fraction of 
links compromised and on the fraction of captured messages. 
This behaviour is expected for fraction of links compromised 
since the message generation is independent of node and link 
captures. However, it is quite unintuitive not to have a change 
for the fraction of message capture. Here, of course, the 
amount of messages captured increases with increasing 
message generation rate, but the total number messages also 
increases in the same rate so that the fraction remains the 
same.  
Although it can be observed in other figures, the gap 
between two metrics is best visualized in Figure 4. The 
fraction of captured messages is always higher than the 
fraction of links compromised. The proportional difference is 
higher at the beginning; 10% link compromise results in 40% 
of the messages captured by the attacker (at ~200 minutes). 
The proportional difference reduces in time, but the difference 
is still significant. For example, when the 40% of the links are 
compromised, 80% of the messages become captured by the 
attacker (at ~900 minutes). This significant gap implies that 
the resiliency intuition of the fraction of links compromised 
metric is misleading. The actual harm of the attack on the 
This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE ICC 2009 proceedings
Authorized licensed use limited to: ULAKBIM UASL - SABANCI UNIVERSITY. Downloaded on November 25, 2009 at 04:19 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
network, in terms of messages captured, is much higher than 
what the fraction of link compromise value implies. This is 
another important result obtained from our dynamic analysis 
model. 
 
Figure 4.  Resiliency metrics w.r.t. simulation time for different message 
generation rates 
One may easily see from Figure 4 that simulations with 
low message generation rates run longer than others. This is 
due to the fact that: (i) we plot the results until the sink 
becomes disconnected from the rest of the network; (ii) for 
smaller message generation rates, the batteries of the nodes 
last longer since less messages are forwarded in the network 
resulting longer lifetime.  
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we propose a simulation model for dynamic 
resiliency analysis of wireless sensor networks against node 
captures and show the deficiencies of the existing analysis 
models. We propose a novel and realistic resiliency metric 
called message capture fraction and analyzed it dynamically 
in the time dimension. We compare the results with the 
classical resiliency metric of fraction of links compromised 
and see that the classical metric does not realistically show the 
harm of the node capture attacks. We obtained two important 
results that cannot be obtained using classical analysis 
techniques: 1) the real effect of the attack is more severe at the 
beginning and the rate of increase of the harm reduces in time; 
2) the fraction of links compromised metric is misleading such 
that it is much smaller than the fraction of captured messages.  
Fraction of links compromised metric used in classical 
resiliency analysis techniques is an unrealistic one since it 
does not take into account actual routes. In fact, compromising 
a node's keys is harmful only when it is used to encrypt 
messages during message forwarding. However, this fact is 
not considered in the classical techniques using fraction of 
links compromised metric. 
We use EG random key predistribution scheme [1] and 
minimum cost forwarding protocol [2] in our analyses. As 
future work, we plan to adapt our model to different key 
distribution schemes and routing protocols. 
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